Described by Pope Gregory I (the Great) in the 6th century and then elaborated in the 13th century by St. Thomas Aquinas in his famous Summa Theologica, the seven heavenly virtues are: Humility, Charity, Chastity, Gratitude, Temperance, Patience, and Diligence. Each of these “heavenly virtues” was set in counter to one of the corresponding “Seven Deadly Sins.” These sins are: Pride, Greed, Lust, Envy, Gluttony, Wrath, and Sloth.

What Are The Seven Heavenly Virtues?

The seven heavenly virtues are: Humility, Charity, Chastity, Gratitude, Temperance, Patience, and Diligence. St. Thomas Aquinas emphasizes that all virtues are interconnected and perfected by charity, and that the supernatural virtues require divine grace for their full realization in the human soul.

Chastity (Castitas)

For Aquinas, chastity is the virtue that moderates the sexual appetite according to right reason. He treats it as a species of temperance in his Summa Theologiae (II-II, Q. 151). Aquinas argues that chastity doesn’t merely involve abstinence but rather the proper ordering of sexual desire according to one’s state in life. For married persons, chastity involves fidelity and appropriate sexual expression within marriage; for the unmarried, it means abstinence. He emphasizes that chastity is not about suppressing sexuality but directing it toward its proper end – the procreation and education of children within marriage, and the expression of marital love.

Temperance (Temperantia)

Aquinas considers temperance one of the four cardinal virtues, which he discusses extensively (II-II, Q. 141-154). He defines it as the virtue that moderates the attraction of pleasures and provides balance in the use of created goods. Temperance primarily concerns the pleasures of touch, particularly those related to food, drink, and sex. Aquinas notes that temperance preserves the good of reason against the onslaught of passion. He distinguishes between integral parts (shamefacedness and honesty), subjective parts (abstinence, sobriety, chastity, and purity), and potential parts (continence, humility, meekness, and modesty).

Charity (Caritas)

Aquinas regards charity as the greatest of all virtues, calling it the “form of all virtues” (II-II, Q. 23). He defines charity as friendship with God – a mutual love between God and humans based on God’s communication of His own beatitude. Charity is infused directly by God and cannot be acquired through human effort alone. It directs all other virtues to their ultimate end, which is God. Aquinas explains that charity extends to love of neighbor, as we love others for God’s sake. He argues that the order of charity begins with God, then extends to self, neighbor, and even one’s own body.

Diligence (Diligentia)

While Aquinas doesn’t treat diligence as a distinct virtue in the same systematic way, he discusses it under various related concepts like studiousness (studiositas) and magnificence. He sees diligent effort as opposing both sloth (spiritual laziness) and curiosity (undisciplined intellectual wandering). In his treatment of sloth (acedia), which diligence opposes (II-II, Q. 35), Aquinas describes it as sorrow about spiritual good. Diligence, therefore, involves zealous effort in pursuing spiritual goods and fulfilling one’s duties, particularly in divine service.

Patience (Patientia)

Aquinas treats patience as a virtue annexed to fortitude (II-II, Q. 136). He defines it as the virtue that enables one to bear evils and sorrows without being broken by them. Patience prevents sorrow from overwhelming reason. He distinguishes patience from mere endurance, noting that true patience is motivated by love of God and preserves the good of reason. Aquinas argues that patience is necessary for all virtues since every virtue encounters obstacles that must be endured. He considers it impossible to have perfect patience without charity, as supernatural patience requires divine grace.

Kindness (Misericordia)

Aquinas discusses kindness primarily under the concept of mercy (misericordia) and beneficence (II-II, Q. 30-31). He defines mercy as compassion for another’s distress coupled with a desire to alleviate it. Aquinas argues that mercy, while an emotion in the sensitive appetite, becomes a virtue when regulated by reason. He notes that God’s mercy differs from human mercy in that God acts from the fullness of His goodness rather than from any deficiency. Human kindness participates in divine mercy and should be exercised according to right reason, helping others in their genuine needs.

Humility (Humilitas)

Aquinas provides an extensive treatment of humility (II-II, Q. 161), calling it a virtue that restrains the immoderate desire for one’s own excellence. He argues that humility primarily concerns one’s interior disposition before God, recognizing one’s complete dependence on divine grace. Aquinas outlines twelve degrees of humility, adapted from St. Benedict’s Rule. He clarifies that humility doesn’t require thinking falsely lowly of oneself but rather having an accurate assessment of one’s position before God. True humility recognizes both one’s gifts (as coming from God) and one’s limitations and sins. He considers it a potential part of temperance, as it moderates the movement of hope toward difficult goods.

What Are The Seven Deadly Sins?

These seven deadly sins are: Pride, Greed, Lust, Envy, Gluttony, Wrath, and Sloth. St. Thomas Aquinas emphasizes that these capital sins are “capital” (from caput, head), because they are the sources or leaders of other sins. They represent fundamental disorders in the human appetite that, when indulged, generate multiple other moral failures. He consistently relates each sin to its opposition to proper reason and divine charity, showing how each represents a turning away from God toward some created good sought in a disordered manner.

Pride (Superbia)

Aquinas considers pride the most grave of all sins and the root of all other sins (II-II, Q. 162). He defines pride as the inordinate desire for one’s own excellence, whereby a person desires to be above what they truly are. Aquinas distinguishes pride from the mere recognition of one’s genuine gifts, which is appropriate. Rather, pride involves either attributing to oneself what comes from God, or believing one has merited from God what is purely gratuitous, or despising others while believing oneself uniquely excellent. He identifies pride as the sin that turned angels into demons and caused humanity’s fall. Aquinas notes that pride is especially dangerous because it corrupts even good acts, as when one performs virtuous deeds for vainglory.

Greed/Avarice (Avaritia)

Aquinas treats avarice as the immoderate love of possessing wealth (II-II, Q. 118). He argues that avarice sins against both oneself and one’s neighbor – against oneself by creating disorder in one’s affections, and against neighbors through injustice in acquiring or retaining wealth. Aquinas distinguishes between the sin of excess (desiring too much) and the sin of defect (not using wealth for necessary purposes). He identifies avarice as a capital sin because it gives rise to many other sins: treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and hardness of heart. Aquinas notes that as people age, they often become more avaricious due to increasing awareness of human weakness and the desire for security.

Lust (Luxuria)

Aquinas defines lust as the inordinate desire for venereal pleasure (II-II, Q. 153-154). He systematically categorizes different species of lust according to the circumstances that make sexual acts disordered. These include simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction, rape, and acts contrary to nature. Aquinas argues that lust is especially harmful because it overthrows the order of reason more than other sins, as venereal pleasure particularly absorbs the mind. He identifies the “daughters” of lust as blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy, rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world, and despair of the future world. Lust disorders not only the individual but also society, as it undermines the proper ordering of marriage and family.

Envy (Invidia)

Aquinas analyzes envy as sorrow over another’s good insofar as it is perceived to diminish one’s own excellence (II-II, Q. 36). He carefully distinguishes envy from other forms of sorrow over another’s good – it’s not fear that another might harm us, nor righteous indignation over the undeserving prospering, but specifically sadness that another’s good makes us seem lesser by comparison. Aquinas considers envy especially grave because it directly opposes charity, which rejoices in our neighbor’s good. He notes that envy gives rise to whispering, detraction, joy at our neighbor’s misfortune, and grief at their prosperity. Envy is a capital sin because it naturally gives rise to many other sins in the attempt to diminish others’ excellence.

Gluttony (Gula)

Aquinas treats gluttony as the inordinate desire for food and drink (II-II, Q. 148). He specifies that gluttony doesn’t consist in the mere pleasure of eating, which is natural and good, but in seeking this pleasure inordinately. Following Gregory the Great, Aquinas identifies five ways gluttony manifests: eating too soon (praepropere), too expensively (laute), too much (nimis), too eagerly (ardenter), or too daintily (studiose). He argues that gluttony, while typically not the gravest sin, can become mortal when one prefers the pleasure of food to God or violates divine commands for the sake of gluttony. The daughters of gluttony include unseemly joy, scurrility, uncleanness, loquaciousness, and dullness of mind.

Wrath (Ira)

Aquinas analyzes wrath as the inordinate desire for vengeance (II-II, Q. 158). He distinguishes between the passion of anger, which can be good when moderated by reason (as in righteous anger), and the sin of wrath, which seeks revenge contrary to the order of reason. Wrath becomes sinful when one desires excessive punishment, or punishment of the undeserving, or seeks vengeance through improper means, or acts from improper motives. Aquinas identifies the daughters of wrath as indignation, swelling of the mind, contumely, clamor, blasphemy, and quarreling. He notes that while wrath is less grave than hatred, it can lead to very grave external acts due to the vehemence of the passion.

Sloth/Acedia (Acedia)

Aquinas provides a particularly nuanced analysis of sloth, which he defines not as mere laziness but as sorrow about spiritual good (II-II, Q. 35). Specifically, acedia is a kind of oppressive sorrow that weighs upon the mind so that one does not want to act. It involves a disgust with the divine good that charity should make us love. Aquinas considers this especially grave because it directly opposes the joy of charity. He distinguishes sloth from mere physical tiredness or the natural shrinking from difficult tasks. The daughters of sloth include malice, spite, faint-heartedness, despair, sluggishness in regard to the commandments, and wandering of the mind after unlawful things. Aquinas sees sloth as particularly dangerous in the spiritual life because it can lead to complete spiritual paralysis.

How Are The Seven Heavenly Virtues Set In Counter To The Seven Deadly Sins?

It’s worth noting that while the Seven Deadly Sins (septem peccata capitalia) were systematically treated as a specific group by Aquinas, the Seven Heavenly Virtues as a corresponding set were not as formally systematized in his work. He extensively discusses all these virtues, but they’re often found in different contexts:

Temperantia, Caritas, Patientia, and Humilitas receive dedicated questions in the Summa Theologiae
Castitas is treated as a part of temperance
Diligentia appears more implicitly through his discussions of opposing vices
Benignitas/Misericordia is discussed under various aspects of charity and justice

The systematic pairing of seven specific virtues to oppose the seven capital sins was more fully developed by later medieval theologians building on Aquinas’s foundation. While these pairings didn’t fully represent Aquinas’s rich, nuanced understanding and complex analysis of how virtues combat vices through the integral action of reason, will, grace, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The neat pairing that became popular in later medieval catechesis was as follows:

Humility vs. Pride
Charity vs. Envy
Patience vs. Wrath
Diligence vs. Sloth
Temperance vs. Gluttony
Charity/Liberality vs. Greed
Chastity vs. Lust

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