“But a fool must always find some person, that is more foolish, in order to keep himself in good humour with his own parts and understanding.” – David Hume
Today we share the thoughts of Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) from his famous work ‘A Treatise Of Human Nature’, which was originally published as three separate books between 1739 and 1740, ‘Of The Understanding’, ‘Of The Passions’, and ‘Of Morals’, with the aim of introducing to the study of human psychology an experimental method of reasoning as did Isaac Newton to the study of the physical sciences in the late 1600s.
Quotes From ‘A Treatise Of Human Nature’
Quotes are excerpted from the Penguin Classics edition of ‘A Treatise Of Human Nature’, published in 1985 and featuring an introduction by Ernest C. Mossner.
Autonomy
“All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds… IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS… Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning…” – Book 1 – Of The Understanding; Part 1 – Of The Ideas, Their Origin, Composition, Connexion, Abstraction; Sect 1 – Of The Origin Of Our Ideas
“… the mind cannot form any notion of quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of the degrees of each…” – Book 1 – Of The Understanding; Part 1 – Of The Ideas, Their Origin, Composition, Connexion, Abstraction; Sect 7 – Of Abstract Ideas
“… all our ideas are copy’d from our impressions.” – Book 1 – Of The Understanding; Part 3 – Of Knowledge And Probability; Sect 1 – Of Knowledge
“Thus it appears, that the belief or asset, which always attends the memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present; and that this alone distinguishes them from the imagination. To believe is in this case to feel an immediate impression of the senses, or a repetition of that impression in the memory. ‘Tis merely the force and liveliness of the perception, which constitutes the first act of the judgment, and lays the foundation of that reasoning, which we build upon it, when we trace the relation of cause and effect.” – Book 1 – Of The Understanding; Part 3 – Of Knowledge And Probability; Sect 5 – Of The Impressions Of The Senses And Memory
“There is implanted in the human mind a perception of pain and pleasure, as the chief spring and moving principle of all its actions.” – Book 1 – Of The Understanding; Part 3 – Of Knowledge And Probability; Sect 10 – Of The Influence Of Belief
“Tho’ an idle fiction has no efficacy, yet we find by experience, that the ideas of those objects, which we believe either are or will be existent, produce in a lesser degree the same effect with those impressions, which are immediately present to the senses and perception The effect, then, of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the passions. This effect it can only have by making an idea approach an impression in force and vivacity.” – Book 1 – Of The Understanding; Part 3 – Of Knowledge And Probability; Sect 10 – Of The Influence Of Belief
“As belief is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions, so the passions in their turn are very favourable to belief.” – Book 1 – Of The Understanding; Part 3 – Of Knowledge And Probability; Sect 10 – Of The Influence Of Belief
“‘Tis certain we cannot take pleasure in any discourse, where our judgment gives no assent to those images which are presented to our fancy.” – Book 1 – Of The Understanding; Part 3 – Of Knowledge And Probability; Sect 10 – Of The Influence Of Belief
“… it appears upon the whole, that every kind of opinion or judgment, which amounts not to knowledge, is deriv’d entirely from the force and vivacity of the perception, and that these qualities constitute in the mind, what we call the BELIEF of the existence of any object. This force and this vivacity are most conspicuous in the memory; and therefore our confidence in the veracity of that faculty is the greatest imaginable, and equals in many respects the assurance of a demonstration… The belief, which attends our memory, is of the same nature with that, which is deriv’d from our judgments: Nor is there any difference betwixt that judgment, which is deriv’d from a constant and uniform connexion of causes and effects, and that which depends upon an interrupted and uncertain.” – Book 1 – Of The Understanding; Part 3 – Of Knowledge And Probability; Sect 13 – Of Unphilosophical Probability
“… nothing is more evident, than that the human mind cannot form such an idea of two objects, as to conceive any connexion betwixt them, or comprehend distinctly that power or efficacy, by which they are united. Such a connexion wou’d amount to a demonstration, and wou’d imply the absolute impossibility for the one object not to follow, or to be conceiv’d not to follow upon the other: Which kind of connexion has already been rejected in all cases.” – Book 1 – Of The Understanding; Part 3 – Of Knowledge And Probability; Sect 14 – Of The Ideas Of Necessary Connexion
“The idea of necessity arises from some impression. There is no impression convey’d by our senses, which can give rise to that idea. It must, therefore, be deriv’d from some internal impression, or impression of reflection…Either we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing but that determination of the thought to pass from causes to effects and from effects to causes, according to their experienc’d union.” – Book 1 – Of The Understanding; Part 3 – Of Knowledge And Probability; Sect 14 – Of The Ideas Of Necessary Connexion
“‘Tis a common observation, that the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impressions, which they occasion, and which always make their appearance at the same time that these objects discover themselves to the senses.”- Book 1 – Of The Understanding; Part 3 – Of Knowledge And Probability; Sect 14 – Of The Ideas Of Necessary Connexion
“… all knowledge resolves itself into probability, and becomes at last of the same nature with that evidence, which we employ in common life…” – Book 1 – Of The Understanding; Part 4 – Of The Sceptical And Other Systems Of Philosophy; Sect 1 – Of Scepticism With Regard To Reason
“As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, ‘tis to be consider’d, upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no memory, we never shou’d have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person. But having once acquir’d this notion of causation from the memory, we can extend the same chain of causes, and consequently the identity of our persons beyond our memory, and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, which we have entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed. For how few of our past actions are there, of which we have any memory?… Identity depends on the relations of ideas; and these relations produce identity, by means of that easy transition they occasion.” – Book 1 – Of The Understanding; Part 4 – Of The Sceptical And Other Systems Of Philosophy; Sect 6 – Of Personal Identity
“‘Tis certain, that the mind, in its perceptions, must begin somewhere; and that since the impressions precede their correspondent ideas, there must be some impressions, which without any introduction make their appearance in the soul…“ – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 1 – Of Pride And Humility; Sect 1 – Division Of The Subject
“… certain properties of human nature… have a mighty influence on every operation both of the understanding and passions… The first of these is the association of ideas… ‘Tis impossible for the mind to fix itself steadily upon one idea for any considerable time; nor can it by its utmost efforts ever arrive at such a constancy… The second property… in the human mind is a like association of impressions. All resembling impressions are connected together, and no sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow… In the third place, ‘tis observable of these two kinds of association, that they very much assist and forward each other, and that the transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same object.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 1 – Of Pride And Humility; Sect 4 – Of The Relations Of Impressions And Ideas
“… those two faculties of the mind, the imagination and passions, assist each other in their operation, when their propensities are similar, and when they act upon the same object.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 2 – Of Love And Hatred; Sect 2 – Experiments To Confirm This System
“Ideas never admit of a total union, but are endow’d with a kind of impenetrability, by which they exclude each other, and are capable of forming a compound by their conjunction, not by their mixture. On the other hand, impressions and passions are susceptible of an entire union; and like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression, which arises from the whole.“ – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 2 – Of Love And Hatred; Sect 6 – Of Benevolence And Anger
“Since reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition… the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion… Nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse… Thus it appears… Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 3 – Of The Will And Direct Passions; Sect 3 – Of The Influencing Motives Of The Will
“‘Tis remarkable, that the imagination and affections have close union together, and that nothing, which affects the former, can be entirely indifferent to the latter.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 3 – Of The Will And Direct Passions; Sect 6 – Of The Influence Of The Imagination On The Passions
“Upon the whole, this struggle of passion and of reason, as it is call’d, diversifies human life, and makes men so different not only from each other, but also from themselves in different times.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 3 – Of The Will And Direct Passions; Sect 8 – The Same Subject Continu’d
“The mind by an original instinct tends to unite itself with the good, and to avoid the evil, tho’ they be conceiv’d merely in idea, and be consider’d as to exist in any future period of time.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 3 – Of The Will And Direct Passions; Sect 9 – Of The Direct Passions
“Since morals… have an influence on the actions and affections… they cannot be deriv’d from reason… The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 1 – Of Virtue And Vice In General; Sect 1 – Moral Distinctions Not Deriv’d From Reason
“Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood.” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 1 – Of Virtue And Vice In General; Sect 1 – Moral Distinctions Not Deriv’d From Reason
“… our passions, volitions, and actions, are not… either contrary or conformable to reason.” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 1 – Of Virtue And Vice In General; Sect 1 – Moral Distinctions Not Deriv’d From Reason
“… reason… can have influence on our conduct only after two ways: Either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion. These are the only kinds of judgment, which can accompany our actions.” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 1 – Of Virtue And Vice In General; Sect 1 – Moral Distinctions Not Deriv’d From Reason
“All the advantages of art are owing to human reason…” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 3 – Of The Other Virtues And Vices; Sect 4 – Of Natural Abilities
“There are many… qualities of the mind, whose merit is deriv’d from the same origin. Industry, perseverance, patience, activity, vigilance, application, constancy… temperance, frugality, economy, resolution…” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 3 – Of The Other Virtues And Vices; Sect 4 – Of Natural Abilities
Social Capital
“Men always consider the sentiments of others in their judgment of themselves.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 1 – Of Pride And Humility; Sect 8 – Of Beauty And Deformity
“No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 1 – Of Pride And Humility; Sect 11 – Of The Love Of Fame
“The praises of others never give us much pleasure, unless they concur with our own opinion, and extol us for those qualities, in which we chiefly excel… the pleasure, which we receive from praise, arises from a communication of sentiments…” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 1 – Of Pride And Humility; Sect 11 – Of The Love Of Fame
“‘Tis obvious, that people associate together according to their particular tempers and dispositions…” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 2 – Of Love And Hatred; Sect 4 – Of The Love Of Relations
“Nothing has a greater tendency to give us an esteem for any person, than his power and riches; or a contempt, than his poverty and meanness…” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 2 – Of Love And Hatred; Sect 5 – Of Our Esteem For The Rich And Powerful
“In all creatures, that prey not upon others, and are not agitated with violent passions, there appears a remarkable desire of company, which associates them together, without any advantages, they can ever propose to reap from their union. This is still more conspicuous in man, as being the creature of the universe, who has the most ardent desire of society, and is fitted for it by the most advantages. We can form no wish, which has not a reference to society. A perfect solitude is, perhaps, the great punishment we can suffer.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 2 – Of Love And Hatred; Sect 5 – Of Our Esteem For The Rich And Powerful
“In general we may remark, that the minds of men are mirrors to one another…” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 2 – Of Love And Hatred; Sect 5 – Of Our Esteem For The Rich And Powerful
“Men often act knowingly against their interest: For which reason the view of the greatest possible good does not always influence them.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 3 – Of The Will And Direct Passions; Sect 3 – Of The Influencing Motives Of The Will
“‘Tis easy to observe, that the passions, both direct and indirect, are founded on pain and pleasure, and that in order to produce an affection of any kind, ‘tis only requisite to present some good or evil. Upon the removal of pain and pleasure there immediately follows a removal of love and hatred, pride and humility, desire and aversion, and of most of our reflective or secondary impressions.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 3 – Of The Will And Direct Passions; Sect 9 – Of The Direct Passions
“Society provides a remedy for these three inconveniences. By the conjunction of forces, our power is augmented: By the partition of employments, our ability increases: And by mutual succour we are less expos’d to fortune and accidents. ‘Tis by this additional force, ability, and security, that society becomes advantageous. But in order to form society, ‘tis requisite not only that it be advantageous, but also that men be sensible of these advantages…” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 2 – Of Justice And Injustice; Sect 2 – Of The Origin Of Justice And Property
“There is nothing, which touches us more nearly than our reputation, and nothing on which our reputation more depends than our conduct, with relation to the property of others.” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 2 – Of Justice And Injustice; Sect 2 – Of The Origin Of Justice And Property
“… all property depends on morality…” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 2 – Of Justice And Injustice; Sect 6 – Some Farther Reflections Concerning Justice And Injustice
“But tho’ it be possible for men to maintain a small uncultivated society without government, ‘tis impossible they shou’d maintain a society of any kind without justice, and the observance of those three fundamental laws concerning the stability of possession, its translation by consent, and the performance of promises.” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 2 – Of Justice And Injustice; Sect 8 – Of The Source Of Allegiance
“… every particular person’s pleasure and interest being different, ‘tis impossible men cou’d ever agree in their sentiment and judgments, unless they chose some common point of view…” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 3 – Of The Other Virtues And Vices; Sect 1 – Of The Origin Of The Natural Virtues And Vices
“… we may observe, that a genuine and hearty pride, or self-esteem, if well conceal’d and well founded, is essential to the character of a man of honour, and that there is no quality of the mind, which is more indispensably requisite to procure the esteem and approbation of mankind.” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 3 – Of The Other Virtues And Vices; Sect 2 – Of Greatness Of Mind
Virtues
“No weakness of human nature is more universal and conspicuous than what we commonly call CREDULITY, or a too easy faith in the testimony of others…” – Book 1 – Of The Understanding; Part 3 – Of Knowledge And Probability; Sect 9 – Of The Effects Of Other Relations And Other Habits
“Next to the ridicule of denying an evident truth, is that of taking much pains to defend it.” – Book 1 – Of The Understanding; Part 3 – Of Knowledge And Probability; Sect 16 – Of The Reason Of Animals
“… nature seems to have observ’d a kind of justice and compensation in every thing…” – Book 1 – Of The Understanding; Part 4 – Of The Sceptical And Other Systems Of Philosophy; Sect 3 – Of The Ancient Philosophy
“… under the indirect passions I comprehend pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their dependants. And under the direct passions, desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and security.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 1 – Of Pride And Humility; Sect 1 – Division Of The Subject
“‘Tis evident, that pride and humility, tho’ directly contrary, have yet the same object. This object is self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 1 – Of Pride And Humility; Sect 2 – Of Pride And Humility; Their Objects And Causes
“The reason, why pride is so much more delicate… than joy, I take to be, as follows. In order to excite pride, there are always two objects we must contemplate, viz. the cause or that object which produces pleasure; and self, which is the real object of the passion. But joy has only one object to its production, viz. that which gives pleasure…” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 1 – Of Pride And Humility; Sect 6 – Limitations Of This System
“… pride and humility… VICE and VIRTUE… are the most obvious causes of these passions…” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 1 – Of Pride And Humility; Sect 7 – Of Vice And Virtue
“Nothing flatters our vanity more than the talent of pleasing by our wit, good humour, or any other accomplishment; and nothing gives us a more sensible mortification than a disappointment in any attempt of that nature.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 1 – Of Pride And Humility; Sect 7 – Of Vice And Virtue
“…pleasure, as a related or resembling impression, when plac’d on a related object, by a natural transition, produces pride; and its contrary, humility.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 1 – Of Pride And Humility; Sect 8 – Of Beauty And Deformity
“Vice, when plac’d on another, excited, by means of its double relations, the passion of hatred, instead of love, which for the same reason arises from virtue.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 2 – Of Love And Hatred; Sect 2 – Experiments To Confirm This System
“The passions of love and hatred are always follow’d by, or rather conjoin’d with benevolence and anger… love and hatred are not completed within themselves, nor rest in that emotion, which they produce, but carry the mind to something farther.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 2 – Of Love And Hatred; Sect 6 – Of Benevolence And Anger
“‘Tis worthy of observation concerning that envy, which arises from a superiority in others, that ‘tis not the great disproportion betwixt ourself and another, which produces it; but on the contrary, our proximity.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 2 – Of Love And Hatred; Sect 8 – Of Malice And Envy
“Benevolence… arises from a great degree of misery, or any degree strongly sympathiz’d with…” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 2 – Of Love And Hatred; Sect 9 – Of The Mixture Of Benevolence And Anger With Compassion And Malice
“… the mind has a much stronger propensity to pride than to humility.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 2 – Of Love And Hatred; Sect 10 – Of Respect And Contempt
“Since a passion can never, in any sense, be call’d unreasonable, but when founded on a false supposition, or when it chuses means insufficient for the design’d end, ‘tis impossible, that reason and passion can ever oppose each other, or dispute for the government of the will and actions.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 3 – Of The Will And Direct Passions; Sect 3 – Of The Influencing Motives Of The Will
“What we call strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent; tho’ we may easily observe, there is no man so constantly posses’d of this virtue, as never on any occasion to yield to the sollicitations of passion and desire.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 3 – Of The Will And Direct Passions; Sect 3 – Of The Influencing Motives Of The Will
“… every emotion, which precedes or attends a passion, is easily converted into it. Hence every thing, that is new, is most affecting, and gives us either more pleasure or pain, than what, strictly speaking, naturally belongs to it.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 3 – Of The Will And Direct Passions; Sect 5 – Of The Effects Of Custom
“Opposition not only enlarges the soul; but the soul, when full of courage and magnanimity, in a manner seeks opposition.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 3 – Of The Will And Direct Passions; Sect 8 – The Same Subject Continu’d
“When good is certain or probable, it produces JOY. When evil is in the same situation there arises GRIEF or SORROW. When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rise to FEAR or HOPE, according to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side or the other. DESIRE arises from good consider’d simply, and AVERSION is deriv’d from evil. The WILL exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attain’d by any action of the mind or body. Beside good and evil, or in other words, pain and pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites. These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections.” – Book 2 – Of The Passions; Part 3 – Of The Will And Direct Passions; Sect 9 – Of The Direct Passions
“… were virtue discover’d by the understanding; it must be an object of one of these operations… of human understanding… the comparing of ideas [or] the inferring of matter of fact.” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 1 – Of Virtue And Vice In General; Sect 1 – Moral Distinctions Not Deriv’d From Reason
“‘Tis one thing to know virtue, and another to confirm the will to it.” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 1 – Of Virtue And Vice In General; Sect 1 – Moral Distinctions Not Deriv’d From Reason
“Vice and virtue… may be compar’d to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which… are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind.” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 1 – Of Virtue And Vice In General; Sect 1 – Moral Distinctions Not Deriv’d From Reason
“… since vice and virtue are not discoverable merely by reason, or the comparison of ideas, it must be by means of some impression or sentiment they occasion, that we are able to mark the difference betwixt them.” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 1 – Of Virtue And Vice In General; Sect 2 – Moral Distinctions Deriv’d From A Moral Sense
“…. some virtues… produce pleasure and approbation from the circumstances and necessity of mankind. Of this kind I assert justice to be…” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 2 – Of Justice And Injustice; Sect 1 – Justice, Whether A Natural Or Artificial Virtue?
“… virtuous actions derive their merit only from virtuous motives…” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 2 – Of Justice And Injustice; Sect 1 – Justice, Whether A Natural Or Artificial Virtue?
“The qualities of the mind are selfishness and limited generosity… ‘tis only from the selfishness and confin’d generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin… ” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 2 – Of Justice And Injustice; Sect 2 – Of The Origin Of Justice And Property
“That many of the natural virtues have this tendency to the good of society, no one can doubt of. Meekness, beneficence, charity, generosity, clemency, moderation, equity bear the greatest figure among the moral qualities, and are commonly denominated the social virtues, to mark their tendency to the good of society.” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 3 – Of The Other Virtues And Vices; Sect 1 – Of The Origin Of The Natural Virtues And Vices
“The approbation of moral qualities most certainly is not deriv’d from reason, or any comparison of ideas; but proceeds entirely from a moral taste, and from certain sentiments of pleasure or disgust… Moral good and evil are certainly distinguish’d by our sentiments, not by reason… these sentiments may arise… from… causes… intermix’d in our judgments of morals…”- Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 3 – Of The Other Virtues And Vices; Sect 1 – Of The Origin Of The Natural Virtues And Vices
“Every quality of the mind is denominated virtuous, which gives pleasure by the mere survey; as every quality, which produces pain, is call’d vicious.” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 3 – Of The Other Virtues And Vices; Sect 1 – Of The Origin Of The Natural Virtues And Vices
“But tho’ an over-weaning conceit of our own merit be vicious and disagreeable, nothing can be more laudable, than to have a value for ourselves, where we really have qualities that are valuable. The utility and advantage of any quality to ourselves is a source of virtue, as well as its agreeableness to others; and ‘tis certain, that nothing is more useful to us in the conduct of life, than a due degree of pride, which makes us sensible of our own merit, and gives us a confidence and assurance in all our projects and enterprises.” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 3 – Of The Other Virtues And Vices; Sect 2 – Of Greatness Of Mind
“Courage, intrepidity, ambition, love of glory, magnanimity, and all the other shining virtues of that kind, have plainly a strong mixture of self-esteem in them, and derive a great part of their merit from that origin.” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 3 – Of The Other Virtues And Vices; Sect 2 – Of Greatness Of Mind
“Courage and ambition, when not regulated by benevolence, are fit only to make a tyrant and public robber.” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 3 – Of The Other Virtues And Vices; Sect 3 – Of Goodness And Benevolence
“As wisdom and good-sense are valued, because they are useful to the person possess’d of them; so wit and eloquence are valued, because they are immediately agreeable to others. On the other hand, good humour is lov’d and esteem’d, because it is immediately agreeable to the person himself. ‘Tis evident, that the conversation of a man of wit is very satisfactory; as a cheerful good-humour’d companion diffuses a joy over the whole company, from a sympathy with his gaiety. These qualities, therefore, being agreeable, they naturally beget love and esteem, and answer to all the characters of virtue.” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 3 – Of The Other Virtues And Vices; Sect 4 – Of Natural Abilities
“… pride and humility, love and hatred, are excited by any advantages or disadvantages of the mind, body, or fortune… that effect by producing a separate impression of pain or pleasure. The pain or pleasure, which arises from the general survey or view of any action or quality of the mind, constitutes its vice or virtue, and gives rise to our approbation or blame…” – Book 3 – Of Morals; Part 3 – Of The Other Virtues And Vices; Sect 5 – Some Farther Reflections Concerning The Natural Virtues
Thanks for reading!