‘The Federalist Papers’ were originally written by Jay, Madison, and Hamilton as a series of 85 essays, and published under the collective pseudonym “Publius”, in New York newspapers, between October 27, 1787 and May 28, 1788, in an effort to promote the ratification of the Constitution of the United States. The main ideas discussed in ‘The Federalist Papers’ include separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, and the importance of centralized government.

‘The Federalist Papers’ Of John Jay, James Madison & Alexander Hamilton

Our notes and quotes for today are gathered from the 2019 Racehorse Publishing edition of ‘The Federalist Papers’, featuring an introduction by Alan Dershowitz. Let’s get to it!

‘The Federalist’ No. 1

• “To the People of the State of New York: After an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the Union, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world.”
• “… it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.”
• “… the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision [of sovereignty] is to be made…”
• “… our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good.”
• “… in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.”
• “… the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty…”

‘The Federalist’ No. 2

• “Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite powers.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 3

• “… a cordial Union, under an efficient national government, affords… the best security that can be divided against hostilities from abroad.”
• “The just causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation of treaties or from direct violence.”
• “… not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them amicably.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 4

• “… the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot be provided for without government…”
• “One government can…”
  • “… avail itself of the talents and experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found.”
  • “… harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each.”
  • “In the formation of treaties… regard the interest of the while, and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole.”
  • “… apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system.”
  • “… place the militia under one plan of discipline and… consolidate them into one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if divided…”
• “If [foreign nations] see that our national government is efficient and well administered,  our trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit reestablished, our people free, contented, and united, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 5

• “An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt… kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by this union the whole… being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of different interest, will be enabled to resist all its enemies.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 7

• “Divide et impera must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 8

• “Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to it dictates.”
• “It is the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority.”
• “… in a Constitution, the whole power… is lodged in the hands of a people, or their representatives and delegates…”

‘The Federalist’ No. 9

• “A firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 12

• “The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a primary object of their policial cares.”
• “A nation cannot long exist without revenues… Revenue, therefore, must be had at all events. In this country, if the principal part be not drawn from commerce, it must fall with oppressive weight upon land.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 13

• “If the States are united under one government, there will be but one national civil list to support…”
• “Civil power, properly organized and exerted, is capable of diffusing its force to a very great extent; and can, in a manner, reproduce itself in every part of a great empire by a judicious arrangement of subordinate institutions.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 14

• “We have seen the necessity of the Union…”:
  • “… as our bulwark against foreign danger,”
  • “… as the guardian of our commerce and other common interests,”
  • “… as the only substitute for those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the Old World,”
  • “… as the proper antidote for the diseases of faction,”

‘The Federalist’ No. 15

• “We must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens, – the only proper objects of government.”
• “Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military force; by the coercion of the magistracy, or by the coercion of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity, be employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 22

• “The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the people. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 23

• “The principal purposes to be answered by union are these”:
  • “… the common defense of the members;”
  • “… the preservation of the public peace as well against internal convulsions as external attacks;”
  • “… the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States;”
  • “… the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.”
• “… it is both unwise and dangerous to deny the federal government an unconfined authority, as to all those objects which are intrusted to its management.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 25

• “War, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by practice.”
• “Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be observed, because they know that every breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which out to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 26

• “The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of providing for the national defense, is one of those refinements which owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 27

• “The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the dread of punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 28

• “… the whole power of the proposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the people. This is the essential, and, after all, only efficacious security for the rights and privileges of the people, which is attainable in civil society.”
• “The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with the increased extent of the state, provided the citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend them. The natural strength of the people in a large community, in proportion to the artificial strength of the government, is greater…”
• “… in a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the masters of their own fate.”
• “It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority.”
• “Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 30

• “Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as that which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure a regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources of the community will permit, may be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in every constitution.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 34

• “To judge from the history of mankind, we shall be compelled to conclude that the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human breast with much more powerful sway than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace; and that to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting tranquility, is to calculate on the weaker springs of the human character.”
• “What are the chief sources of expense in every government? What has occasioned that enormous accumulation of debts with which… nations are oppressed? The answer plainly is, wars and rebellions; the support of those institutions which are necessary to guard the body politic against these two most mortal diseases of society.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 35

• “There is no part of the administration of government that requires extensive information and a thorough knowledge of the principles of political economy, so much as the business of taxation.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 37

• “The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that all power should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted with it should be kept in independence on the people, by a short duration of their appointments; and that even during this short period the trust should be placed not in a few, but a number of hands.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 41

• “… the consequences of disunion cannot be too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves peace, every man who loves his country, every man who loves liberty, ought to have it ever before his eyes, that he may cherish in his heart a due attachment to the Union of America, and be able to set a due value on the means of preserving it.”
• “… danger from standing armies is a limitation of the term for which revenue may be appropriated to their support.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 45

• “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State government are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 46

• “The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 51

• “In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit.”
• “Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 52

• “The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican governments. It was incumbent on the convention, therefore, to define and establish this right in the Constitution.”
• “As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 53

• “Happily for mankind, liberty is not… confined to any single point of time; but lies within extremes, which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations which may be required by the various situations and circumstances of civil society.”
• “The important distinction… between a Constitution established by the people and unalterable by the government, and a law established by the government and alterable by the government, seems to have been little understood and less observed in any other country.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 56

• “A proper regulation of commerce requires much information…”
• “Taxation will consist, in a great measure, of duties which will be involved in the regulation of commerce.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 57

• “The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 59

• “It ought never to be forgotten, that a firm union of this country, under an efficient government, will probably be an increasing object of jealousy to more than one nation… and that enterprises to subvert it will sometimes originate in the intrigues of foreign powers, and will seldom fail to be patronized and abetted by some of them. Its preservation, therefore ought in no case that can be avoided, to be committed to the guardianship of any but those whose situation will uniformly beget an immediate interest in the faithful and vigilant performance of the trust.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 62

• “No government, any more than an individual, will long be respected without being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable, without possessing a certain portion of order and stability.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 63

• “… however requisite a sense of national character may be, it is evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous and changeable body. It can only be found in a number so small that a sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be the portion of each individual; or in an assembly so durably invested with public trust, that the pride and consequence of its members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and prosperity of the community.”
• “The House of Representatives, with the people on their side, will at all times be able to bring back the Constitution to its primitive form and principles.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 64

• “However useful jealousy may be in republics, yet when like bile in the natural, it abounds too much in the body politic, the eyes of both become very liable to be deceived by the delusive appearances which that malady casts on surrounding objects.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 66

• “The security essentially intended by the Constitution against corruption and treachery in the formation of treaties, is to be sought for in the number and characters of those who are to make them.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 68

• “The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 70

• “Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.”
  • “[Energy in the Executive] is essential to…”
    • “… the protection of the community against foreign attacks;”
    • “… the steady administration of the laws;”
    • “… the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice;”
    • “… the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.”
  • “The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are”:
    • Unity
    • Duration
    • Adequate provision for its support
    • Competent powers
    • Unity
• “… one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive… is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility.”
• “… in a republic… every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 72

• “The administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the body politic, whether legislative, executive, or judiciary; but in its most usual, and perhaps its most precise significance, it is limited to executive details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the executive department.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 76

• “… the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 78

• “The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.”
• “… as nothing can contribute so much to [judiciary] firmness and independence as permanency in office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitution, and, in a great measure, as the citadel of the public justice and the public security.”
• “The complete independence of the courts of justice is… essential in a limited Constitution.”
• “A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body.”
• “… the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statue, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.”
• “… the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments…”

‘The Federalist’ No. 81

• “The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no rights of action, independent of the sovereign will.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 82

• “The erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of intricacy and nicety; and these may, in a particular manner, be expected to flow from the establishment of a constitution founded upon the total or partial incorporation of a number of distinct sovereignties. ‘Tis time only that can mature and perfect so compound a system, can liquidate the meaning of all the parts, and can adjust them to each other in a harmonious and consistent whole.”

‘The Federalist’ No. 83

• “… maxims relied upon will not bear the use made of them…”

‘The Federalist’ No. 85

• “To balance a large state or society… on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many must unite in the work; experience must guide their labor; time must bring it to perfection; and the feeling of inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they inevitably fall into in their first trials and experiments.”
• “A nation, without a national government, is… an awful spectacle.”
• “The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a prodigy.”

Final Thoughts

Jay, Madison, and Hamilton weren’t just arguing for a new form of government – they were laying out timeless principles about human nature, power, and the delicate balance required for free societies to flourish.

What stands out most is their sophisticated understanding of the inherent tensions in democratic governance. They recognized that government must be strong enough to protect liberty, yet constrained enough not to destroy it. Their solution – a system of separated powers, checks and balances, and federalism – wasn’t born from abstract theory, but from a deep understanding of history and human nature. They understood that weak government invites chaos and ultimately tyranny, while unchecked government becomes tyranny directly. Their insight that “Justice is the end of government” remains the fundamental aspiration of constitutional democracy.

The Federalist Papers remind us that self-government is both humanity’s great achievement and its perpetual challenge, and that even the best constitution would fail without citizens who understand and defend their rights. As they concluded, “The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a prodigy.” That prodigy requires each generation to understand, appreciate, and renew the principles that make free government possible.

Thanks for reading!