The work of Vincent Ostrom studied the effect of institutions and rules on individual and group behavior, as well as how institutions transform, and are transformed by, individuals.

A leader in administrative theory and master of political sociology, Vincent Ostrom has been recognized for several important contributions, not the least of which include: the introduction of public goods theory to public administration and political science, a tireless championing of quasi-markets as an alternative (more often than not a preferred alternative) to the direct production of government goods and services, his advocacy of polycentrism (together with his famous wife Elinor Ostrom), and his extending and generalizing of the theoretical implications of Tiebout’s 1956 observations published in ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures‘.

In arguably his most important work, ‘The Intellectual Crisis in Public Administration’, which was first published in 1973, Vincent Ostrom outlined his observation of a breakdown of the intellectual foundation of public administration as a result of the concentration of power centers in government and the separation of the will of state policy from administration, and suggested that fragmentation of authority among decision centers within a jurisdiction and the overlapping of jurisdictional authority are key to advancing human welfare and a stable political order.

The Big List Of Vincent Ostrom Quotes

Quotes from “The Big List Of Vincent Ostrom Quotes” are gathered from the Second Edition of ‘The Intellectual Crisis in Public Administration’, published in 1989 by The University Of Alabama Press. Enjoy!

“The range of possibilities at the command of human choice today far exceeds those available to prior generations. But a wealth of possibilities always interposes proportionately higher decision costs. The more benign the future of this civilization, the more time and effort will be required in fashioning decision structures appropriate to human creativity and the less we can afford to rely upon preemptive strategies involving speed and dispatch. The course of destruction is simple; the course of constructive action is much more complex and difficult.”
“The more fundamental the revolution, the fewer the commensurabilities that will exist between the old and the new.”
“In the absence of a product market in which a consumer is not free to choose among alternatives, public enterprises must provide complex political decision-making arrangements for translating individual preferences into collective choices regarding the provision of public goods and services.”
“When the central problem in public administration is viewed as the provision of public goods and services, alternative forms of organization may be available for the performance of those functions apart from an extension and perfection of bureaucratic structures. Bureaucratic structures are necessary but not sufficient for a productive and responsive public service economy.”
“Administration is an invariant relationship in all systems of government…”
“Perfection in administrative organization is attained in a hierarchically ordered and professionally trained public service. Efficiency is attained by the perfection of this structural arrangement.”
“There will always be a single dominant center of power in any system of government; and the government of a society will be controlled by that single center of power.”
“The more power is divided the more irresponsible it becomes; or, alternatively, the more power is unified and directed from a single center the more responsible it will become.”
“The structure of a constitution defines and determines the composition of that center of power and establishes the political structure relative to the enactment of law and the control of administration. Every system of democratic government will exalt the people’s representatives to a position of absolute sovereignty.”
“The field of politics sets the task for administration, but the field of administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics.”
“All modern governments will have a strong structural similarity so far as administrative functions are concerned.”
“Perfection in the hierarchical ordering of a professionally trained public service provides the structural conditions necessary for ‘good’ administration.”
“Perfection in hierarchical organization will maximize efficiency as measured by least cost expended in money and effort.”
“Perfection of ‘good’ administration is a necessary condition for modernity in human civilization and for the advancement of human welfare.”
“Precision, speed, knowledge, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, and reduction of friction and of material and personal costs are the attributes of strictly bureaucratic administration.”
“Bureaucracy has a ‘rational’ character: rules, means, ends, and matter-of-factness dominate its bearings.”
“… unity of command, span of control, chain of command, departmentalization by major functions, and direction by single heads of authority in subordinate units of administration are assumed to have universal applicability in the perfection of administrative arrangements.”
“Efficiency in government depends on two conditions: the consent of the governed and good management.”
“… efficient management… must be built into a piece of machinery.”
“The essential problem in administrative organization is that of enhancing rationality in human choice, given the radical limits inherent in the psychology of choice.”
“The function of organization is to bound the rationality exercised by each person as a decision maker working within an organization.”
“Unrestricted individualistic choice in relation to common-property resources or public goods can generate destructive competition so that the greater the individual effort, the worse off people become. Because of this competitive dynamic, individuals cannot be expected to form large voluntary associations to pursue matters of common or public interest unless special conditions can be met. These conditions will exist only when members can derive a separable benefit of a sufficient magnitude to cover the cost of membership or when they can be coerced through some form of levy or taxation into bearing their share of the costs.”
“Bureaucratic organization implies reliance upon hierarchy requiring subordinates to defer to the commands of superiors in the selection of appropriate actions and subject to sanctions or discipline for failure to do so.”
“Bureaucratic organization can reduce some of the costs… of individualistic choice.”
“In the organization of any management program, recourse to a hierarchical command structure will permit economic advantage to be realized whenever production processes require a pooling of efforts through a division of labor which takes advantage of common production facilities. This rationale applies to both private firms and public agencies.”
“Bureaucratic organization is a method for enhancing efficiency in operations by minimizing decision or transaction costs within… limits or zones of authority…”
“The larger the organization becomes, the smaller the percentage of its activities will relate to output and the larger the proportion of its efforts will be expended on management.”
“… very large public bureaucracies will engender bureaucratic free enterprise when individuals and groups within an organization proceed to formulate their own missions with opportunities for side payoffs, including graft and corruption. Goal displacement and risk avoidance motivated by individual self-interest will generate organizational dysfunctions as elaborate justifications are fabricated to cover potential exposures to the scrutiny of superior authorities.”
“… a bureaucratic organization is an organization that cannot correct its behavior by learning from its errors.”
“Producer efficiency in the absence of consumer utility is without economic meaning.”
“If individuals are to surmount the problems inherent in the tragedy of the commons and are to avoid the pathologies of the fully developed bureaucracy, they are confronted with the task of conceptualizing alternative institutional arrangements for the organization of collective or public enterprises.”
“Bureaucratic free-enterprise need not be the vice… if (1) a bureaucracy is immediately accountable to the relevant community of interest for which it is acting, (2) the costs of providing a joint good are funded by the constituents in proportion to their benefit or in accordance with some comparable rule of equitable allocation, and (3) public facilities are subject to use under terms and conditions that are considered by the relevant community to be reasonably designed to advance their common welfare. If these conditions can be met, we can contemplate the possibility of organizing a self-governing collective enterprise with an organizational structure capable of internalizing decision-making arrangements appropriate to the community of interests associated with the management of a common property or the provision of a public good.”
“In responding to problems of diverse economies of scale, elements of centralization and decentralization must exist simultaneously among several jurisdictions with concurrent authority.”
“Several conditions would appear to be logically necessary for a system of positive constitutional law”:
- “A system of positive constitutional law will necessarily depend upon processes of constitutional decision making which exist, at least in part, outside the competence of governmental authorities who are subject to its provisions. A positive constitution must be unalterable by governmental authorities acting upon their own motions if such authorities are to be limited in their decision-making capabilities.”
- “A system of legally enforceable constitutional law will necessarily depend upon an explicit formulation of the constitutional authority of persons in terms of rights which are not subject to alienation (that is, cannot be alienated, transferred, or taken away) by governmental authorities. The constitutional authority of persons creates correlative limits upon the authority of those who exercise governmental prerogatives. Persons will then be able to exercise constitutional authority in asserting their claims as against governmental decision makers.”
- “A system of positive constitutional law will necessarily depend upon a separation of powers so that each set of governmental decision makers will act in relation to limits placed upon their authority by other sets of governmental officials. Some form of separation of powers, or fragmentation of authority, thus, is a logically necessary condition for enforcing provisions of constitutional law as against governmental decision makers.”
- “A system of positive constitutional law will also depend upon citizens who are prepared to pay the price of civil disobedience in being willing to challenge the constitutional validity of any law or official action and face punishment and official displeasure if their cause is not affirmed. Persons in a constitutional republic must be able to initiate and sustain causes of action in the protection of their constitutional rights and in the imposition of limits upon governmental authorities. The constitutional office of persons assumes substantial significance in the maintenance of a lawful constitutional order. We might, then, assume that the ultimate authority to deal with the jurisdiction of government rests broadly in all of those who function as members in such a political community and share a common theory of constitutional design.”
- ”A positive constitutional law will depend upon the existence of alternative political regimes each with its own charters of constitution so that individuals can have access to different units of government to articulate diverse communities of interest. Each individual will have access to alternative regimes and to the political, judicial, and constitutional remedies afforded by those diverse regimes. Conflicts of interest can be articulated in diverse forums. The actions of officials in each regime will serve to establish limits upon the exercise of discretion by those who act on behalf of other regimes.”
“Attempts to eliminate costs inherent in the design of any system may lead to its impairment and to elimination of the benefits accruing from that system.”
“A political system designed to enforce a system of positive constitutional law as against one designed to articulate the exercise of a unitary sovereign will necessarily involve costs in delay, open controversy, and complex relationships.”
“The basic propositions relating to a science of democratic administration inherent in a paradigm that grows out of the work of modem political economists and that of the early democratic theorists can be summarized as follows”:
- “Individuals who exercise the prerogatives of government are no more nor no less corruptible than their fellow citizens.”
- “The structure of a constitution allocated decision-making capabilities among a community of persons; and a democratic constitution defines the authority inherent in both the prerogatives of persons and the prerogatives of different governmental offices so that the capabilities of each are limited by the capabilities of others. The task of establishing and altering organizational arrangements in a democratic society is to be conceived as a problem of constitutional choice.”
- “The exercise of political authority – a necessary power to do good – will be usurped by those who perceive an opportunity to exploit such powers to their own advantage and to the detriment of others unless authority is divided and different authorities are so organized as to limit and control one another.”
- “The provision of public goods and services depends on decisions taken by diverse sets of decision makers and the political feasibility of each collective enterprise depends on a favorable course of decisions in all essential decision structures over time. Public administration lies within the domain of politics.”
- “A variety of different organizational arrangements can be used to provide different public goods and services. Such organizations can be coordinated through various multi-organizational arrangements including trading and contracting to mutual advantage, competitive rivalry, adjudication of conflicts, and the power of command in limited hierarchies.”
- “Perfection in the hierarchical ordering of a professionally trained public service accountable to a single center of power will reduce the capability of a large administrative system to respond to diverse preferences among citizens for many different public goods and services and to cope with diverse environmental conditions.”
- “Perfection in hierarchical organization accountable to a single center of power will not maximize efficiency as measured by least-cost expended in time, effort, and resources.”
- “Fragmentation of authority among diverse decision centers with multiple veto capabilities within any one jurisdiction and the development of multiple, overlapping jurisdictions of widely different scales are necessary conditions for maintaining a stable political order that can advance human welfare under rapidly changing conditions.”
“Popular control over government is ineffective.”
“Each unit should have a single chief executive, either elected by the people or appointed by the local legislative body…”
“The theory of externalities, common properties, and public goods would postulate the criterion that the domain of a public agency should coincide with boundaries of the appropriate field of effects so that substantial interdependencies are internalized within the jurisdiction of an appropriate agency… optimality can be attained only by reference to multiple agencies with overlapping jurisdictions.”
“An eminent and powerful structure of local government is a basic ingredient of a society which seeks to give the individual the fullest possible freedom and responsibility.”
“… coordination… must be induced, overseen, managed, and directed from… the Executive Office… where the authority exists to identify problems that need settlement, expedite discussion, referee disputes, make binding decisions, and issue orders.”
“Voluntary action by citizens in providing for the common welfare of fellow citizens has a place in democratic societies which can never be fully replaced by paid functionaries and mass mobilization campaigns.”
“The task in fashioning a system of democratic administration is how to restrict the power of command to a minimum and substitute structures of economic, political, and judicial control rather than relying on a single overreaching bureaucracy to coordinate all human efforts.”
“… shift from a preoccupation with the organization to concerns with the opportunities individuals can pursue in multi-organizational environments.”
“A democratic theory of administration will not be preoccupied with simplicity, neatness, and symmetry but with diversity, variety, and responsiveness to the preferences of constituents.”
“A system of democratic administration depends on an ordered complexity in social relationships.”
“A new political science is needed for a new world if the human potential of democratic societies is to be realized through a system of democratic administration. Success depends on a knowledge of both the capabilities and limitations of diverse organizational forms, which can be used to minimize the power of command and yield services to enhance the welfare of people.”
“A small ruling circle can easily dominate larger masses of people. The smaller the number of a ruling circle who have the capacity to command authoritative action, the greater the ease of pursuing preemptive strategies. A monocratic structure in which all functionaries are integrated in a hierarchy culminating in a single head has the greatest advantage in pursuing preemptive strategies.”
“Administrative organization is a key to control over the enforcement apparatus of government.”
“Laws depend on mechanisms for enforcement to become effective.”
“If Executive instructions can be interposed to direct enforcement practices apart from the prescriptions of general law, then Executive instructions become objective law.”
“It is a serious error to presume… that the study of administration should start from a base of management rather than the foundation of law.”

Final Thoughts

Vincent Ostrom’s intellectual legacy offers a profound challenge to conventional wisdom about governance and administration. His work reminds us that the pursuit of administrative efficiency through hierarchical perfection often comes at the cost of responsiveness, innovation, and human dignity. The tragedy isn’t just in the commons, but in our persistent belief that centralized control can solve problems better than distributed intelligence.

What strikes me most about Ostrom’s vision is its radical optimism disguised as pragmatism. While acknowledging human fallibility—that those who govern are “no more nor no less corruptible than their fellow citizens”—he doesn’t retreat into cynicism. Instead, he builds a framework where this very fallibility becomes the foundation for resilient institutions. Multiple decision centers, overlapping jurisdictions, and constitutional constraints aren’t inefficiencies to be eliminated; they’re the immune system of democratic society.

His observation that “the course of destruction is simple; the course of constructive action is much more complex and difficult” feels particularly prescient in our current moment. As we face challenges that span from local communities to global systems, the temptation to seek simple, centralized solutions grows stronger. Yet Ostrom’s work suggests that our salvation lies not in the perfect bureaucracy or the benevolent algorithm, but in the messy, contested, multi-centered arrangements that allow human creativity to flourish within bounds.

Perhaps most importantly, Ostrom reminds us that administration isn’t merely a technical problem to be solved, but a deeply human endeavor that must remain connected to the communities it serves. In an age of increasing complexity and interdependence, his call for “a new political science for a new world” resonates not as nostalgia for simpler times, but as a blueprint for navigating complexity while preserving human agency and dignity.

The intellectual crisis he identified in 1973 hasn’t been resolved—if anything, it has deepened. But in that crisis lies opportunity: to reimagine governance not as the perfection of control, but as the cultivation of conditions where diverse human communities can solve their own problems, learn from their mistakes, and build the foundations of their own flourishing.

Thanks for reading!